The Fallujah awakening: a case study in counter-insurgency

The successful pacification of Fallujah in 2007 during the Anbar Awakening movement was due to the coordinated efforts of US and Iraqi forces to physically and psychologically separate the people from the insurgency. Efforts along security, political, and development lines along with a robust tribal effort eliminated the armed insurgency and set the basis for victory in the area. But a synchronized delivery of these resources was insufficient to defeat the insurgency by itself absent the population's decision to turn against the insurgents. This process began to occur in 2006 and was successfully capitalized upon by Coalition Forces in Fallujah in 2007.     

Optimizing submarine berthing with a persistence incentive

Submarine berthing plans reserve mooring locations for inbound U.S. Navy nuclear submarines prior to their port entrance. Once in port, submarines may be shifted to different berthing locations to allow them to better receive services they require or to make way for other shifted vessels. However, submarine berth shifting is expensive, labor intensive, and potentially hazardous. This article presents an optimization model for submarine berth planning and demonstrates it with Naval Submarine Base, San Diego. After a berthing plan has been approved and published, changed requests for services, delays, and early arrival of inbound submarines are routine events, requiring frequent revisions. To encourage trust in the planning process, the effect on the solution of revisions in the input is kept small by incorporating a persistence incentive in the optimization model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 301–318, 1997.     

A comparison of waiting time approximations in series queueing systems

The determination of steady-state characteristics in systems of tandem queues has been left to computer simulation because of the lack of exact solutions in all but the simplest newtorks. In this paper, several methods developed for approximating the average waiting time in single-server queues are extended to systems of queues in series. Three methods, due to Fraker, Page, and Marchal, are compared along with results gathered through GPSS simulation. Various queueing networks with Erlangian service distributions are investigated.     

Remaking alliances for the war on terrorism

This essay contends that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them and their institutional form is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Despite these differences, some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the past are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. This essay concludes by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted and offers recommendations for improving US alliances.     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

Factors that affect the optimal amount of central control in complex systems

Whereas much of the previous research in complex systems has focused on emergent properties resulting from self‐organization of the individual agents that make up the system, this article studies one vital role of central organization. In particular, four factors are conjectured to be key in determining the optimal amount of central control. To validate this hypothesis, these factors are represented as controllable parameters in a mathematical model. For different combinations of parameter values, the optimal amount of central control is found, either analytically or by computer simulation. The model is shown to provide results that match well with the level of control found across a broad spectrum of specific complex systems. This model also provides general guidelines as to how combinations of these factors affect the desirable level of control and specific guidelines for selecting and evaluating leaders. These results indicate that all of these factors, though not exhaustive, should be considered carefully when attempting to determine the amount of control that is best for a system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012